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EXECUTORY CONTRACTS wITH FINANCIAL ACCOMMODATIONS:
A PLEA FOR BIFURCATION UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 365
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code1 (the Code) in 1978, courts
and attorneys2 have grappled with the issue of how to characterize execu-
tory contracts between debtors3 and other parties. Under Code section
365(a),4 a trustee5 may elect to assume6 or reject 7 a debtor's' executory
contracts.9 The basic purpose of this provision is to allow the debtor to
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)).
2. According to several bankruptcy attorneys, parties to bankruptcy cases often hotly contest
the characterization of executory contracts, though they usually do not litigate the issue.
3. When a company files a Chapter 11 petition, it technically assumes the title "debtor in
possession." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988). The "debtor in possession" usually retains possession of
the company's assets and operates the business despite the bankruptcy filing. Entities filing under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 retain the simple "debtor" designation.
4. Section 365(a) reads: "Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in subsec-
tions (b), (c) and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, may assume or reject
any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1988).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988) provides that a debtor in possession has the rights and powers of
a trustee subject to certain inapplicable exceptions. Therefore, in Chapter 11 cases, the debtor is the
trustee, unless a party in interest or the United States Trustee persuades the court to appoint a
trustee for cause or because it is in the best interests of creditors pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1104. A
Chapter 13 debtor may elect to assume or reject executory contracts subject to section 365 as part of
a bankruptcy plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(7). Debtors filing under Chapter 7 must abide by
the trustee's judgment concerning assumption or rejection.
6. A trustee must affirmatively elect to assume a contract because when a party files for bank-
ruptcy, it creates a new legal entity which is distinct from the debtor prior to bankruptcy, who was
the original party to the contract. Assumption means that the debtor will perform, and will expect
the other party's performance, according to the terms of the contract. See Raymond T. Nimmer,
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Fundamental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 507, 513 (1983). Generally, a trustee must elect to assume a contract within 60 days after
the order for relief or the court will consider the contract rejected. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1) (1988).
Once the trustee properly assumes the contract, it may assign the contract to benefit the estate on the
condition that the assignee provides adequate assurance regardless of whether or not the debtor
previously defaulted on the contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(0 (1988).
7. Rejection is simply repudiation and breach of the contract. Nimmer, supra note 6, at 513.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) states, "[C]hapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title apply in a case under chapter
7, 11, 12, or 13 of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988). Consequently, the debtor to which section
365 refers may have filed under any of the appropriate chapters.
9. The drafters of the Code did not specifically define "executory contract." The legislative
history states:
Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are executory, it generally includes
contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides. A note is not
usually an executory contract if the only performance that remains is repayment. Perform-
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rid itself of contracts that are burdensome to the estate 0 and to retain
the benefits of favorable contracts as it attempts to make a "fresh
start."' However, section 365 contains several exceptions to the general
election rule. Section 365(c)(2)12 provides that a trustee may not assume
an executory contract to extend "financial accommodations." 3 In con-
ance on one side of the contract would have been compiled and the contract is no longer
executory.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 347 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963,
6303-04. However, most courts accept Professor Vern Countryman's definition of executory con-
tract. According to Countryman, an executory contract is "a contract under which the obligation of
both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the
other." Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
(1973). See also In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1980) (accepting Countryman's
definition); Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 352 (6th Cir. 1978)
(same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978). But see In re Norquist, 43 B.R. 224, 226-27 (Bankr. E.D.
Wash. 1984) (suggesting that Countryman's definition does not support the purpose and spirit of the
Code).
Michael Andrew has proposed a slight variation of the Countryman definition. He defines an
executory contract as one that consists of two necessary elements: "(a) debtor and non-debtor each
have unperformed obligations, and (b) the debtor, if it ceased further performance, would have no
right to the other party's continued performance." Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Understanding "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 893 (1988).
An in-depth discussion of what constitutes an executory contract is beyond the scope of this Note.
For a general overview, see Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74
MINN. L. REv. 227 (1989); Benjamin Weintraub & Alan N. Resnick, From the Bankruptcy Courts:
What is an Executory Contract? A Challenge to the Countryman Test, 15 UCC L.J. 273 (1983).
10. Under I1 U.S.C. § 541(a), at the commencement of a bankruptcy case, "all legal and equi-
table interests of the debtor in property" become property of the estate. I 1 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
But see 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(b), 541(c)(2) (listing exceptions). This broad definition of estate includes a
debtor's executory contracts. The trustee's power to reject burdensome contracts parallels its power
to abandon property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). See Don Fogel, Executory Con-
tracts and Unexpired Leases in the Bankruptcy Code, 64 MINN. L. REv. 341, 343 (1980). See also
Douglas Bordewieck & Vern Countryman, The Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements by
Chapter 11 Debtors, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 293, 303 (1983) (viewing § 365 as a limitation on
§ 541(a)(1) by giving the debtor the option to decide whether executory contracts and unexpired
leases comprise property of the estate), cited in THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LoGIC AND LIMIrs op
BANKRUPTCY LAW 106 n.3 (1986).
11. See infra Subpart II(B).
12. Section 365(c)(2) states:
(c) the trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or
delegation of duties, if-
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or finan-
cial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of the
debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1988).
13. Id. Other types of contracts not subject to election under section 365 generally include
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sistent language, section 365(e)(2)(B)14 reinforces section 365(c)(2) by ex-
cluding contracts to extend financial accommodations from subjection to
the general principle that a party to a contract may not terminate the
contract upon bankruptcy regardless of any ipso facto termination
clause. 5 When a nondebtor party proves to a court that section
365(e)(2)(B) applies to an executory contract, the party has demon-
strated "cause" for relief from the automatic stay 16 under section
362(d)(1), 7 and the court should grant the subsequent right to terminate
the contract.18 This "financial accommodations" exception to section
those which contain an uncured default, 11 U.S.C. § 365(b) (1988), those between the debtor and a
party who is excused from performance under applicable law, 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (1988), or those
not designated as "assumed" or "rejected" in a timely manner, 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1988).
14. Section 365(e) provides:
(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease, or in applica-
ble law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may not be terminated or
modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or lease may not be terminated
or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision
in such contract or lease that is conditioned on -
(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before the closing
of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment or taking possession by a trustee in a case under this title or a
custodian before such commencement.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment
of rights or delegation of duties, if-
(B) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt financing or
financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor, or to issue a security of
the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (1988).
15. Id.
16. As soon as a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay takes effect prohibiting,
inter alia, the continuation of pending creditor actions, seizure of property of the estate, and any act
to collect, amass, or recover repetition claims against the debtor. 11 U.S.C § 362(a) (1988). Accord-
ing to the legislative history of section 362, the stay should "stop all collection efforts, all harass-
ment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization
plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6297. For a
more detailed discussion of the automatic stay, see Kathleen Thorne, Automatic Stay: Section 362, 3
BANK. R. DEV. J. 181 (1986).
17. Section 362(d) provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief
from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annul-
ling, modifying, or conditioning such stay -
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of
such party in interest.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988).
18. See Government National Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, Inc. (In re Adana
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365 codifies the policy preventing a trustee from forcing a party to extend
new credit to a debtor. 19
Recently, in Citizens and Southern National Bank v. Thomas B. Ham-
ilton Co. (In re Thomas B. Hamilton Co.),20 the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded that a credit card merchant agreement between a debtor retailer
and the debtor's bank was not a financial accommodations contract.21
The holding in this case highlights the difficulty courts encounter when
they attempt to characterize executory contracts for the purpose of sec-
tion 365. Clearly, a credit card merchant agreement requires a bank to
extend credit to the retailer in certain situations.22 Nevertheless, the
court gave the trustee the option to assume this contract under section
365,23 thus obligating the bank to finance a questionable debtor.
One should not fault the court for this decision. The statute does not
define "financial accommodations," 24 and the legislative history of sec-
tion 365 does not help articulate a practical definition. 25 Furthermore,
the cases that apply section 365 fail to characterize these mixed contracts
consistently.26 Consequently, it is never obvious whether or not a court
will allow a trustee to assume an executory contract that has some as-
pects of financial accommodation. Such uncertainty is costly, not only
because bankruptcy filings are increasing,27 but also because it might dis-
Mortgage Bankers, Inc.) 12 B.R. 977, 987-88 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980). According to the court, when
section 365(c) bars assumption, there is no logical reason to maintain the stay, thereby preventing a
party from terminating a nonassumble contract. Id. at 988 ("Termination is the inevitable final
disposition of these [a]greements as allowed under section 365(e)(2).").
19. See infra Subpart II(B).
20. 969 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992).
21. Id.
22. A credit card merchant agreement embodies the complex relationship between a merchant,
the merchant's bank, the credit card company, the cardholder's bank, and the cardholder. When the
cardholder instigates a valid chargeback, the cardholder's bank passes liability for the amount of the
chargeback to the merchant bank and then to the merchant. If the merchant cannot pay (for in-
stance, if the merchant is bankrupt), then the merchant bank extends credit to the cardholder on
behalf of the merchant. See infra Subpart III(A) for a complete discussion of the Hamilton case.
23. Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1014.
24. See supra note 12 for text.
25. The legislative history of § 365 states only that "[c]haracterization of contracts to make a
loan, or extend other debt financing or financial accommodations, is limited to the extension of cash
or a line of credit and is not intended to embrace ordinary leases or contracts to provide goods or
services with payments to be made over time." 124 CONG. REc. 32,396 (statement of Rep. Edwards)
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6436, 6447.
26. See infra Part III for examples of executory contracts that courts have examined.
27. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of bankruptcies filed increased by more than 100%.
See Lester Brickman & Jonathan Klein, The Use of Advance Fee Attorney Retainer Agreements in
Bankruptcy: Another Special Law for Lawyers?, 43 S.C. L. REV. 1037, 1060 n.102 (1992).
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courage the use of voluntary credit transactions which form a basis of
our economy.28
This Note contends that Congress should amend section 365 of the
Code to mandate bifurcation of executory contracts that contain some
financial accommodations provisions. Specifically, Congress should al-
low a trustee to elect to assume or reject the contract without the finan-
cial accommodation provisions. Then, if a trustee chooses to assume a
contract that requires financing, the debtor must secure this credit from
an outside source or make a new agreement with the original contract
party. This bifurcation proposal not only upholds the dual purposes of
section 365-to protect both the debtor and the party advancing
money-but also creates certainty for the parties by providing a straight-
forward method of handling executory contracts included in a debtor's
estate.29
Part II of this Note describes the legislative history of section 365 and
states Congress' reasons for enacting it. Part III traces the courts' seem-
ingly anomalous treatment of executory contracts that have some aspects
of financial accommodation. Part IV outlines the bifurcation proposal
and demonstrates that it is viable and consistent with Code policy, other
Code provisions, and related judicial opinions concerning partial as-
sumption and bifurcation.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
A. Section 365 and Its Predecessor
Congress enacted section 365 as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978.30 Section 365 replaced section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act of
28. See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 514. Nimmer posits that the legal system should promote
voluntary credit transactions. According to Nimmer, parties consider the risk of bankruptcy and the
potential application of section 365 when they negotiate contracts. Id. Carrying this premise to its
logical conclusion, if section 365 is ambiguous and might be applied to the detriment of a party
extending some aspect of financial accommodations, the party will be less willing to contract
voluntarily.
29. See infra Part IV.
30. The enactment of the Code in 1978 was the culmination of an extensive legislative process.
Congress formerly initiated Code drafting in 1970 when it created the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States to examine and recommend changes to the revised version of Bankruptcy
Act of 1898. See Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1971). After three years of
investigation, the Commission submitted a two-part report to Congress on July 30, 1973. The first
part discussed general findings and recommendations. The second part represented a draft of a bill
designed to implement the recommendations of part one. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, Parts I & II, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Congress, Ist
1993]
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1898.31 Section 70(b) substantially codified the case law prior to 193832
by giving the trustee the right to assume or reject an executory contract,
including an unexpired lease.33 The trustee had to make this election
within a prescribed time limit.34 Congress also added section 70(b) to fix
a time for trustee election and to solve the problem of liability assump-
Sess. (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT]. Along with a proposal from the National Confer-
ence of Bankruptcy Judges, the Commission Report was presented to the 93rd Congress as H.R.
10792 and S. 4026.
In 1975, the draft and judges' proposal were reintroduced to the 94th Congress as H.R. 31 and
H.R. 32 and S.235 and S.236 respectively. After the 95th Congress defeated a consensus bill on the
House floor, Congress again revised the bill and reintroduced it to the House as H.R. 8200, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), and to the Senate as S. 2266, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). After hearings in
the Senate, both Houses produced reports. S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787 [hereinafter S. REP.]; H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 [hereinafter H. REP.]. The two bills differed
slightly from each other, but Congress passed a compromise bill extracting elements from each.
Instead of a conference commission report concerning the act that was passed, the legislative leaders
read nearly identical statements into the Congressional Record to explain the differences between the
two bills and the Code as enacted. 124 CONG. REc. 32,392 (statement of Rep. Edwards), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436 [hereinafter Statement of Rep. Edwards]; 124 CONG. REc. 33,992, re-
printed in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505 [hereinafter Statement of Sen. DeConcini]. For a complete dis-
cussion of the legislative history of the Code, see Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New
Bankruptcy Code, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 941 (1979).
31. Congress enacted section 70(b) in the Chandler Act of 1938. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575,
§ 70(b), 52 Stat. 840, 880 (repealed 1978).
32. Early case law tied a trustee's right to reject an executory contract with his ability to aban-
don burdensome property of the estate. A trustee could opt to assume or reject an executory con-
tract depending on its potential profit to the estate. See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcY, I 365.01[a]
(Lawrence P. King ed., 15th ed. 1993). See also Central Trust Co. of Illinois v. Chicago Auditorium
Ass'n., 240 U.S. 581 (1916), cited in COLLIER, supra, 365.01[1], at 365-10.3 n.2.
33. Unlike current section 365(a), see supra note 4, which gives the trustee the right to assume
an executory contract or an unexpired lease, section 70(b) referred to executory contracts including
unexpired leases. However, courts have not considered this change of language to be significant. See
Robert L. Rubin, Comment, Legislative and Judicial Confusion Concerning Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy, 89 DIcK. L. REv. 1029, 1037 n.47 (1985).
34. Section 70(b) provided:
B. Within sixty days after the adjudication, the trustee shall assume or reject any executory
contract, including unexpired leases of real property: Provided, however, That the court
may for cause shown extend or reduce such period of time. Any such contract or lease not
assumed or rejected within such time, whether or not a trustee has been appointed or has
qualified, shall be deemed to be rejected. A trustee shall file, within sixty days after adjudi-
cation, a statement under oath showing which, if any, of the contracts of the bankrupt are
executory in whole or in part, including unexpired leases of real property, and which, if
any, have been rejected by the trustee: Provided, however, That the court may for cause
shown extend or reduce such period of time. Unless a lease of real property shall expressly
otherwise provide, a rejection of such lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee of the
lessor shall not deprive the lessee of his estate. A general covenant or condition in a lease
that it shall not be assigned shall not be construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the
same at his election and subsequently assigning the same; but an express covenant that an
assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/8
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tion by requiring complete performance from debtors who assume execu-
tory contracts.35 Section 70(b) did not contain any statutory language
comparable to that found in section 365(c)(2) making contracts involving
financing unassumable.36 Consequently, under section 70(b), a debtor
could theoretically force a nondebtor party to continue to extend finan-
cial accommodations in accordance with an assumed executory con-
tract.37 However, a party could avoid this situation by including a clause
in the original contract providing that bankruptcy either terminates the
contract or gives the other party the option to terminate. Under section
70(b), such ipso facto termination clauses were enforceable.38
Similar to both early common law and section 70(b), the dominant
purpose of section 365 is to allow a trustee the discretion to examine the
debtor's executory agreements, assume those that benefit the estate, and
reject those that do not.39 However, in developing the 1978 Code provi-
sion dealing with executory contracts, the drafters did not focus solely on
the debtor's election rights as a means of facilitating a debtor's rehabilita-
tion opportunities.4 Exhibiting concern for the parties contracting with
the debtor, the drafters offered direct, instead of indirect,41 protection to
parties extending financing to the debtor. 42 Congress reversed the sec-
tion 70(b) policy upholding termination clauses when it enacted section
365(e)43 which broadly rejects all optional or ipso facto termination
party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to terminate the same
shall be enforceable.
11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (repealed 1978).
35. See COLLIER, supra note 32, 1 365.01[2]. See also Burger King Corp. v. Rovine Corp. (In
re Rovine), 6 B.R. 661, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1980) (stating that both § 70(b) and § 365 were
intended to solve the problem of assumption of liabilities).
36. See supra note 34 for the text of § 70(b). This Note focuses on § 365(c)(2) with the assump-
tion that § 365(e)(2)(B) simply corresponds to the language of the previous subsection.
37. See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRuPrCY, 70.4319], at 536 (14th ed. 1975).
38. Under an ambiguous portion of § 70(b), an express, as opposed to a general, covenant that
assignment resulting from bankruptcy shall terminate the lease was enforceable. See supra note 34
for text of § 70(b). Although the provision only mentioned leases specifically, it most likely applied
to executory contracts as well. See COLLIER, supra note 37, 70.43[8].
39. See Silk Plants, Etc. Franchise Systems, Inc. v. Register (In re Register), 95 B.R. 73, 74
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re G-N Partners, 48 B.R. 462, 465 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985); Rovine, 6
B.R. at 666.
40. See infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Code's rehabilitation
purpose.
41. Ipso facto termination clauses are a means of indirect protection for creditors.
42. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(c)(2) and (e)(2)(B).
43. See supra note 14 for text.
19931
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clauses relating to the financial status of the debtor.' With this change,
Congress effectively denied financiers their indirect method of protecting
themselves against extending new credit to a debtor. However, with the
assistance of outspoken lender advocates at the Senate hearings on the
new bankruptcy bill,45 Congress determined that parties extending fi-
nancing in the executory contract context warrant special, specific
protection. 46
In proposing the legislation that eventually resulted in section
365(c)(2), both the Senate and the House explained that their purpose for
this protection was to prevent parties from having to extend new credit
to a debtor under an assumed executory contract.47 The Senate and
House versions of this legislation differed somewhat, however. The Sen-
ate bill, S. 2266,48 was slightly more inclusive than its counterpart in the
House, H.R. 8200.49 Section 365(b)(4) of S. 2266 prohibited a trustee's
assumption of executory contracts requiring the other party to make a
44. According to the legislative history, Congress believed that ispo facto clauses hampered
rehabilitation. Therefore, Congress invalidated them. See S. REP., supra note 30, at 59; H. REP.,
supra note 30, at 348.
45. Responding to the fact that under section 70(b) a trustee could assume a credit agreement,
thereby forcing the lender to extend new financing, a representative of the American Bankers' Asso-
ciation stated, "We believe that this problem must be met by a clear amendment of section 365 to
preclude the preposterous situation of a lending institution being required to make loans to a bank-
rupt." Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on S.2266 and H.. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 576 (1977) (statement of
Robert Grimmig).
46. In addition to the mere existence of § 365(c)(2) and (e)(2)(B), the legislative history accom-
panying section 365(e) clearly demonstrates the drafters' awareness of the nondebtor party's posi-
tion: "[tihe unforceability of ipso facto or bankruptcy clauses proposed under this section will
require courts to be sensitive to the rights of the nondebtor party to executory contracts and
unexpired leases." S. REP., supra note 30, at 59; H. REP., supra note 30, at 348.
47. The Senate Reports states:
The purpose of this subsection is to make it clear that a party to a transaction which is
based upon the financial strength of a debtor should not be required to extend new credit to
the debtor whether in the form of loans, lease financing or the purchase or discount of
notes.
S. REP., supra note 30, at 59. The House Report similarly reads:
The purpose of this subsection, at least in part, is to prevent the trustee from requiring the
new advances of money or other property. The section permits the trustee to continue to
use and pay for property already advanced, but it is not designed to permit the trustee to
demand new loans or additional transfers of property.
H. REP., supra note 30, at 348. Although the House Report comments that preventing new ad-
vances is only part of the subsection's purpose, it does not mention any other objectives. See also In
re Farrell, 79 B.R. 300, 304 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987) (echoing the purposes proclaimed by
Congress).
48. See supra note 30.
49. See supra note 30
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/8
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loan, deliver equipment, or issue a security to the debtor."0 Although
Section 365(c) of H.R. 8200 did refer to contracts extending debt financ-
ing and financial accommodations, it did not cite contracts that provide
for equipment delivery.I In the compromise bill that was eventually en-
acted,52 Congress adopted the House version of section 365(c).5 3
By approving the narrower House bill at the expense of the Senate
equivalent, Congress illustrated its intent that section 365 should only
apply to select types of executory contracts.54 However, the final lan-
guage of the statute and the few statements of the legislative leaders that
accompany the Code make it difficult to determine which contracts the
provision covers. Courts have difficulty interpreting the terms of section
365, especially the term "financial accommodations." Attempting to de-
fine this ambiguous term, which appears nowhere else in the Code, the
legislative leaders merely stated that contracts to extend financial accom-
modations are those involving extensions of cash or credit. 55
B. Overview of the Bankruptcy Code
Courts have held that in order to give more substance to the term
"financial accommodations," the judiciary should construe the term in
light of the Code's two broad legislative purposes.56 The first purpose is
50. Section 365(b)(4) of S. 2266 provides: "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained
in this section, the trustee may not assume an executory contract to make a loan or deliver equip-
ment to or to issue a security of the debtor." Note that this provision does not contain the term
"financial accommodations." S. 2266 § 365(b)(4), 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
51. Section 365(c)(2) of H.R. 8200 was an amendment to the original bill. The language of the
amendment is identical to current § 365(c)(2). Cf H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
52. See supra note 1.
53. See Statement of Rep. Edwards, supra note 30, at 32,396; Statement of Sen. DeConcini,
supra note 30, at 33, 995-96. Congress eliminated contracts to deliver equipment from the provision.
Professor Nimmer asserts that this exclusion is illogical:
To the extent that a distinction between pure credit contracts and credit sales contracts is
intended, it represents an anomalous discontinuity in the protection of the nonbankrupt
party. The creditor in both types of contracts is faced with a significant change in the
debtor's circumstances that affects fundamental aspects of the original bargain.
Nimmer, supra note 6, at 534.
54. According to the leaders' statements, section 365 is "not intended to embrace ordinary
leases or contracts to provide goods or services with payments to be made over time." Statement of
Rep. Edwards, supra note 30, at 32,396; Statement of Sen. DeConcini, supra note 30, at 33,396.
55. Statement of Rep. Edwards, supra note 30, at 32, 396; Statement of Sen. DeConcini, supra
note 30, at 3396. The premier treatise on bankruptcy adds that the term should be "strictly con-
strued." See COLLIER, supra note 32, 365.05[l], 365-46.
It is worthwhile to note that the extensive 1984 amendments to the Code did not in any way alter
§ 365(c)(2) or (e)(2)(B).
56. See Theatre Holding Corp. v. Mauro, 681 F.2d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1982) (proposing that
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debtor-oriented. The essence of bankruptcy law is to release a debtor
from the burdens of indebtedness and to provide the debtor with a "fresh
start. '5 7 This policy is evident in early case law,58 in the legislative his-
tory of the 1978 Code,59 and in the individual Code provisions them-
selves.' In general, section 365 embodies this fresh start policy by
allowing the trustee to reject those contracts that are burdensome and
might hinder the debtor's rehabilitation. The section also allows the
trustee to assume beneficial contracts that will assist the debtor's recov-
ery from bankruptcy. More specifically, section 365(c)(2) promotes fresh
starts by strictly limiting the types of contracts that are unassumable.
Courts uphold a fresh start policy by interpreting financial accommoda-
tions narrowly and permitting the trustee to assume agreements with
some financing.
Of course, the Code protects creditors as well as debtors. 61 The sec-
ond, equally important purpose of the Code is to provide fair treatment
to creditors.62 Like the fresh start policy, this goal pervades both case
section 365 must be construed in the context of the broad purposes of the Code); Northeast Bank of
Lewiston and Auburn v. Lyon (In re Lyon), 8 B.R. 152, 154 (Bankr. D. Maine 1981) ("The Code's
provisions are to be construed, when reasonably possible, in harmony with the purpose so as to
effectuate the general purpose and policy."). These purposes are especially relevant because this
Note asserts that a bifurcation scheme reflects the Code objectives more fully than the current sec-
tion. See infra Part IV.
57. See generally Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
McDonald (In re McDonald), 129 B.R. 279, 282 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991); In re Campbell, 124 B.R.
462, 464 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991); In re Epstein, 39 B.R. 938, 941 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1984).
58. See generally Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502, 514 (1938) (stating that
goal is to relieve debtor from oppressive indebtedness and to permit the debtor to start afresh),
rehearing denied, 305 U.S. 668 (1938); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating
that goal of the Code is to provide debtors with "a new opportunity in life with a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt").
59. See 123 CONG. REC. 35, 452 (statement of Rep. Drinan). Representative Drinan remarked,
"First we want to give a fresh start to the debtor; in all the writings on bankruptcy, this is the essence
of bankruptcy. Let this poor individual discharge his debts. Ever since the mid-1800s, we do not
put him in jail for debts he cannot pay. Give him a fresh start." Id.
60. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1988) (providing exemptions from the bankruptcy estate for
various items including the homestead, household goods, jewelry, and others); 11 U.S.C. § 525
(1988) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on bankrupt status); 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6)
(1988) (excluding a debtor's post-petition wages from the estate so that the debtor may use them in
rehabilitation).
61. See 123 CONG. REc. 35,452 (statement of Rep. Drinan) ("This is a very balanced bill.
There are some things that help debtors in this bill ... there are many things for creditors too.").
62. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (holding that
the primary objective of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is to minimize the injury to creditors arising
from bankruptcy); In re The Harwald Company, 497 F.2d 443, 444 (7th Cir. 1974) (same); In re
Sanchez, 20 B.R. 431, 433 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1982) (maintaining that the Code is intended to pro-
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law63 and the Code.64 Often the two purposes offset each other.
Although the Code encourages a debtor's fresh start, such rehabilitation
should not occur to the complete detriment of creditors. 65 Clearly, sec-
tion 365(c)(2) directly accomplishes the creditor protection goal by pro-
scribing assumption of financing contracts, thereby preventing a trustee
from compelling a creditor to offer new credit to a potentially unreliable
party. While the fresh start policy requires courts to interpret financial
accommodations narrowly, the term must be loosely construed to protect
creditors, so that fewer agreements are assumable.
As demonstrated, neither the legislative history of section 365 nor that
of the Code as a whole reveals a clear, undisputed and operative interpre-
tation of financial accommodations contracts.
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
Few courts have analyzed executory contracts under section
vide fair treatment to the creditor and debtor). Although the first two cases cited refer to the 1898
Act and not the 1978 Code, the above cases demonstrate that the underlying purposes of the two
acts are consistent.
63. See supra note 62.
64. See, ag., I1 U.S.C. § 361 (1988) (explaining the adequate protection requirement found in
sections 362, 363, and 364); 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1988) (requiring a debtor to cure defaults in
executory contracts and provide adequate assurance before assumption); 11 U.S.C. § 366(b) (1988)
(requiring a debtor to provide adequate assurance to utility resuming service); 11 U.S.C. § 507
(1988) (defining priorities among creditors); 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1988) (permitting Chapter 13 plan
confirmation only when plan passes both the "best interests" and "disposable income" tests).
In addition, the judiciary supports the goal of protecting creditors in its interpretation of certain
Code provisions. For example, courts refuse to expand the reading of 11 U.S.C. § 525(b), which
prohibits private employment discrimination based solely on bankruptcy status, to encompass credit
discrimination based on past debtor status. In other words, courts will not apply section 525 to
order a party to extend credit to a previous debtor even if the refusal is based solely on the debtor's
past bankruptcy and if the party seeking credit offers money upfront. See Rose v. Connecticut
Housing Finance Authority (In re Rose), 23 B.R. 662, 666 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1982) ("[S]ection 525
does not prohibit private discrimination, nor relieve debtors from requirements applicable to all.
'Section 525 does not prohibit private consideration of other factors such as future financial responsi-
bility or ability, and does not prohibit imposition of requirements . . . if applied nondis-
criminatorily.' ") (quoting Henry v. Heyison, 4 B.R. 437, 442 (E.D. Pa. 1980))). But see Douglas G.
Bishkoff, Private Parties and Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, 62 IND. L.J. 159 (1986) (advocating
a reading of section 525 that prevents private parties from considering bankruptcy when extending
credit).
65. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (suggesting that the Act limits the
opportunity for a completely unencumbered new beginning to the "honest but unfortunate debtor.").
See also Nimmer, supra note 6, at 509-10. Professor Nimmer suggests that "[e]xcessive and too
readily available discharge might weaken the general social norm that honestly incurred liabilities
should be voluntarily repaid." Nimmer, supra note 6, at 509-10.
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365(c)(2). 66 In these few cases, courts repeatedly express their confusion
about what constitutes a contract for financial accommodations and how
to treat contracts with multiple purposes that include providing financial
accommodations. 67 Of course, straightforward situations do exist. For
example, a letter of credit or loan commitment is certainly the type of
contract to which section 365(c)(2) applies.68 Conversely, a pre-petition
pledge of capital made with no expectation of future repayment is defi-
nitely not a contract for financial accommodations. 69 Unfortunately, the
majority of disputed contracts exhibit some aspects of financing, but were
not established solely for that purpose. The courts' uncertainty as to
how to deal with these mixed contracts manifests itself in inconsistent
treatment of similar contracts. 70 By comparing the courts' past examina-
tions of executory contracts with the credit card merchant agreement at
issue in In re Hamilton,71 one may conclude that the Eleventh Circuit
could have easily and logically characterized the contract either way by
employing the sound rationale developed by previous courts.72
66. See Gill v. Easebe Enterprises, Inc. (In re Easebe Enterprises), 900 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("[T]here is scant judicial authority on the application of section 365(c)(2)."). As of
March 1993, there are approximately 30 cases on the issue.
67. See In re Cole Brothers, Inc., 137 B.R. 647, 651 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) ("The Bank-
ruptcy Code supplies no further guidance as to what constitutes a contract for financial accommoda-
tion and no express answer is given as to what a court should do when only part of the agreement
provides for financial accommodations."); Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Wills Travel Service, Inc. (In
re Wills Travel Service, Inc.), 72 B.R. 380, 382 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987) ("[Tlhe legislative history
and the remarks are ambiguous .. "), vacated, rehearing granted, 87 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988); Clayton J. Dean v. Postle (In re Postle), 48 B.R. 721, 725 (Bankr. D. Ar. 1985) ("The Code
provides instruction on what to do if a provision is construed to be a financial accommodation, not
whether the transaction constitutes such accommodation in the first instance.").
68. See Farmer v. Crocker Nat'l Bank (In re Swifte Aire Lines, Inc.), 30 B.R. 490, 496 (Bankr.
App. 1983) (holding that a letter of credit is an executory contract for financial accommodations); In
re New Town Mall, 17 B.R. 326, 327-28 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982) (holding that a loan commitment is a
contract for financial accommodations). Both courts rely on the distinct language in the legislative
history: "Under this provision, contracts such as loan commitments and letters of credit are nonas-
signable and may not be assumed by the trustee." H. REP., supra note 30, at 348; S. REP., supra
note 30, at 59. See New Town Mall, 17 B.R. at 328; Farmer, 30 B.R. at 496.
69. See Lowin v. Dayton Sec. Assoc. (In re Securities Group), 124 B.R. 875, 901 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1991) (holding that pledge of capital contribution is not the type of contract contemplated by
section 365).
70. Compare In re Skylark Travel Inc., 120 B.R. 352 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that
agreement between debtor travel agency and national clearinghouse for airline tickets was not finan-
cial accommodations contract) with In re Lockspur, Inc., 82 B.R. 37 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1987) (hold-
ing that the exact same type of contract was a financial accommodations contract).
71. 969 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992).
72. See infra parts III.B, III.C.
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A. In re Hamilton
In In re Hamilton, 3 the Eleventh Circuit determined that a credit
card merchant agreement between a Chapter 11 retail debtor and a
merchant bank was not a contract to extend financial accommodations.7 4
The agreement between Thomas Hamilton Company, Inc.71 and Citizens
and Southern National Bank76 typifies the complex arrangements be-
tween most merchants who are dependent on credit card transactions,
financial institutions, and credit card holders.77 Under this conventional
credit card merchant agreement, the merchant bank purchased sales
drafts generated by the retailer's credit card transactions at a stipulated
percentage of the total credit card sales.78 Meanwhile, the credit card
company 79 transferred the transactional data to banks issuing the credit
card used in the sales."0 These card-issuing banks pay the merchant bank
and bill the cardholder.81 For the purposes of this discussion, the crucial
aspect of the agreement lies in the chargeback procedure. When a card-
holder discovers a valid billing error on a statement, 2 the cardholder is
not obligated to pay the card-issuing bank. However, by the time the
cardholder discovers the error, 3 the card-issuing bank has already trans-
mitted funds to the merchant bank. Therefore, the card-issuing bank has
the right to initiate a "chargeback" against the merchant bank that then
pays the chargeback and usually passes the liability on to the retailer.8 4
73. 969 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1992).
74. In reaching this conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the findings of the bankruptcy
court and district court below. Id.
75. Thomas B. Hamilton Company, Inc. (Hamilton) buys and sells sterling silver products at
the retail level. Id. at 1014.
76. Citizens & Southern National Bank (C & S) is an Atlanta-based bank. Id.
77. Id. at 1017.
78. Id. at 1014-15. More specifically, Hamilton would transmit the customers' credit card in-
formation to an electronic network system at the bank. Within three days of the transaction, Hamil-
ton would release the sales drafts for purchase by C & S. The bank could pay Hamilton for the
drafts by crediting or making adjustments to a commercial account that Hamilton maintained at the
bank or by promptly sending Hamilton a check. Hamilton chose to receive credit to its account. Id.
79. In this case, the credit card companies were Mastercard and Visa. Id. at 1014.
80. At the same time that Hamilton released the sales drafts for purchase, information was
transmitted to Mastercard and Visa. Id. at 1015.
81. The card-issuing banks pay via a settlement process devised by Mastercard and Visa. Id.
82. Billing errors usually occur when the cardholder is charged for goods or services the card-
holder did not receive or accept. Id. The card-issuing bank investigates the cardholder's claim to
evaluate whether it is valid. Id. at 1016.
83. The cardholder has up to 60 days to notify the bank of an error, and then the bank has 90
days to investigate. Id. at 1015-16.
84. Under the terms of the agreement, Hamilton is liable for chargebacks when: 1) the cus-
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The retailer may reimburse the merchant bank in several ways: the bank
may deduct the amount from commercial accounts held for the retailer;
the retailer may pay promptly on demand; or the bank may draw on a
reserve account established for this purpose, if one exists.85 When the
merchant bank pays the chargeback, it is actually extending credit on
behalf of the merchant.86 Under the agreement,87 if the merchant is un-
able to repay the bank because of financial difficulty, the bank bears the
loss.
Although the court in In re Hamilton admitted that the merchant
bank was in fact extending credit to the debtor when valid chargebacks
occurred,88 it rejected the bank's section 365 financial accommodations
argument and allowed the trustee to assume the contract.89 Explicitly
adopting a narrow reading of section 365(c)(2), 90 the court analyzed the
"true legal nature"9 of the contract. Because the primary purpose-and
true legal nature-of the credit card merchant agreement was not to pro-
vide financing but to establish a business relationship that would permit
retail credit card transactions, the court held that the agreement did not
qualify as a financial accommodations contract.92 Essentially, the court
held that incidental credit provisions within a contract will not render it
unassumable.
The court delineated several policy arguments to support its decision.
First, obstructing the trustee's ability to assume such a contract would
tomer returns or does not receive merchandise; 2) the sales transaction exceeds the dollar limitation
of the card; 3) the sales draft was drawn without authority; 4) the sales draft is illegible; 5) the
cardholder disputes the sale, quality, or delivery of the merchandise and the retailer cannot resolve
the dispute; 6) the sales draft is drawn in breach of an agreement; 7) extending the credit violated the
law; or 8) the card is invalid, expired, or listed on a restricted list. Id. at 1016-17,
85. Id. at 1017. C & S never established a reserve fund. Id. Moreover, reserve funds may not
always cover the extended credit sufficiently.
86. See supra note 22.
87. Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1019 (holding a merchant bank liable for chargebacks it could not
recover from merchant).
88. Id. at 1020.
89. Id. at 1021. After C & S learned that Hamilton filed a bankruptcy petition, it asked Hamil-
ton to complete a new credit application. As part of the application process, it subjected Hamilton
to a credit review. Based on the poor results of the review, C & S wished to terminate the existing
credit card merchant agreement. It filed a motion with the bankruptcy court for relief from the
automatic stay so that it could terminate the executory contract to extend financial accommodations
pursuant to section 365(e)(2)(B). Id. at 1017-18.
90. Id. at 1019-20.
91. Id. at 1020 (quoting In re Wills Travel Service, Inc., 72 B.R. 380, 382 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1987)).
92. Id.
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make a retail debtor's rehabilitation virtually impossible.93 Second, it
noted that other Code provisions protect the bank. For example, section
365(a) requires the bankruptcy court's approval for assumption. Ac-
cordingly, the court in In re Hamilton would not authorize assumption if
performance of an agreement would place the nondebtor party at an un-
reasonable risk.94 Finally, the court stressed that section 365(b)95 re-
quires the debtor to cure any defaults, such as failure to reimburse the
bank for chargebacks, before assuming the contract.
96
Nevertheless, it is significant that, in the end, the court doubted some
aspects of its conclusions. The court conceded that its holding actually
increased the bank's financial risk,97 and more importantly, it noted that
not every circumstance involving the type of credit card merchant agree-
ment that was at issue in this case would merit identical treatment. 98
This admission supports the premise that courts are uncertain when
faced with executory contracts. Accordingly, one can never confidently
predict the outcome of a case.
B. Other Contracts that Are Not Financial Accommodations
When other courts reject financial accommodation descriptions, they
emphasize many of the same contractual characteristics that the Hamil-
ton court found significant. First, like the Eleventh Circuit, courts fre-
quently evaluate whether credit provisions in executory contracts are
incidental or fundamental to the purpose of the entire contract. For ex-
ample, in In re Cole Brothers, Inc. 99 the court determined that a trustee
93. Id. at 1021.
94. Id. However, it seems more likely that if the contract did in fact place an unreasonable risk
upon the nondebtor, the court, from the onset, should have declared it unassumable as a financial
accommodations contract.
95. Section 365(b)(1) states:
If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor, the
trustee may not assume such contract or lease unless, at the time of assumption of such
contract or lease, the trustee-
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure such
default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly com-
pensate, a party other than the debtor to such contract or lease, for any actual pecuni-
ary loss to such party resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such contract or lease.
II U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1988).
96. Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1021.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. 137 B.R. 647 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992).
1993]
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could assume a series of dealer agreements that required John Deere to
provide retail financing to qualified customers of the debtor John Deere
dealer."° Although individually the contracts would have been consid-
ered agreements to extend financial accommodations, as a unit, they
formed the basis of a broader business relationship. 10 ' Together, the pur-
pose of the agreements was to create a dealership, not to provide financ-
ing."0 2 Therefore, section 365(c)(2) did not bar the trustee from
assumption. Similarly, in Braniff, Inc. v. GPA Group PLC (In re Bran-
1ff)03 the court succinctly asserted that a lease commitment, partial as-
signment, and purchase agreement relating to an aircraft transaction did
not comprise a contract to extend financial accommodations because the
financing aspects of the contracts were incidental to the objective of the
unified arrangement. 1" The philosophy behind this rationale is best
summarized by the oft-cited theory: to bar every contract in which the
debtor owed money would "allow the exception to swallow the rule."10 5
In addition to conducting an incidental purpose analysis, many courts
consider whether the disputed executory contract is "ordinary." If the
contract resembles the majority of contracts that deal with similar goods
or services, the court is more likely to endorse assumption. 106 In In re
Farrell,1 7 the court held that an ordinary van lease was not a contract to
extend financial accommodations. 108 Similarly, in In re United Press In-
100. Id. at 649, 652.
101. Id. at 650-51. This conclusion is problematic. The court noted, "The statute does not state
whether the debtor is barred from assuming a contract where only a part of the agreement is for
financial accommodation." Id. at 652. The court recognized that several individual agreements
constituted financial accommodation contracts. Id. at 650. However, the court, on its own, decided
to consider the agreements as a whole. Id. at 651.
102. Id. at 651.
103. 118 B.R. 819, 845 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
104. Id. at 845. The Braniff court addressed this issue in only two sentences of the opinion. The
court indicated that the financing was incidental, and that fact alone made it assumable. Id. The
purpose of the contract was to enable the debtor to obtain possession of 26 aircrafts. Id. at 829.
105. Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1019 (quoting In re The Travel Shoppe, 88 B.R. 466, 470 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1988)); In re Farrell, 79 B.R. 300, 304 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987); In re United Press Int'l.,
55 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985).
106. At the onset, one should note that this is an extremely nebulous inquiry.
107. 79 B.R. 300 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987).
108. Id. at 304. While the lease did offer the lessee the option of purchasing the van at the end of
the lease period, the lessee had to pay the fair market value of the vehicle, not nominal consideration.
Therefore, the court concluded that it was a true lease, not a lease intended as a security. Id. at 303.
The lessor was under no duty to provide advances of cash or new property. Therefore, this was not a
financial accommodation. Id. at 304.
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ternational, Inc. ,"09 the court deemed a nonresidential real estate lease,
which required the lessor to prepare the premises for occupancy,"0 as
ordinary and therefore assumable."' Finally, in In re Peaches Records
and Tapes," 2 the court concluded that a lease based on a percentage of
the debtor retailer's gross sales did not constitute a financial accommoda-
tions contract because gross sales percentage is a customary method for
establishing rent.'1 3 If the Hamilton court had undertaken a similar in-
quiry into typicality, its findings would have supported its holding. The
credit card merchant agreement typified arrangements for credit card
services. Under this approach, therefore, it is not a contract to extend
financial accommodations.
The type of executory contract that has been the subject of most litiga-
tion under section 365(c)(2) is the arrangement between debtor travel
agencies and national airline ticket clearinghouses.1 5 Under a normal
agreement, the clearinghouse supplies the travel agency with blank air-
line tickets and airline identification plates that bear the airline's name.
When the agency sells the tickets for cash,' 1 6 it deposits the proceeds into
a special bank account from which the clearinghouse draws funds to
cover what it has paid to the airline for the tickets, less the agency's
commission." 7 These contracts are analogous to some aspects of credit
card merchant agreements. In both instances, the main thrust of the
agreement is to facilitate the use of goods and services, not to provide
financing. In addition, the nondebtors extend credit in a similar fashion.
In both cases, the nondebtor, a merchant bank or clearinghouse, pays a
109. 55 B.R. 63 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1985).
110. The preparation involved erecting partitions and installing electricity and water pipes. Id.
at 64. The mere fact that the lessor bore the burden of preparing the building did not make the lease
financial accommodation. Id. at 65-66. The debtor here received no fiscal benefit, only property
suitable for occupation. Id. at 66.
111. Id. at 67. This case differs from Dean v. Postle Enterprises, Inc. (In re Postle Enterprises,
Inc.), 48 B.R. 721 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). In that case, the court held that a lease which bound the
lessor to provide $150,000 in construction allowances to the debtor was a financial accommodations
contract partially because it did not represent a typical lease. See infra notes 152-53 and accompa-
nying text.
112. 51 B.R. 583 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1985).
113. Id. at 590.
114. Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1017.
115. The issue has been litigated at least seven times. See infra notes 120-32 and accompanying
text.
116. There are separate arrangements for credit sales.
117. See, e.g., In re Skylark, 120 B.R. 352, 352-54 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990). These agreements
are referred to as "ARC" agreements ("Agency Reporting Agreements"). Id.
19931
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third party, a cardholder bank or airline company, on behalf of the
debtor. The nondebtor only suffers financially when the debtor cannot
reimburse according to the respective agreement.1 18
The majority of courts considering these airline agreements have held
that they are not contracts to extend financial accommodations. 1 9 In
Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Wills Travel Service, Inc. (In re Wills Travel
Service), 20 the first case that examined these agreements, the bankruptcy
court declared that the contract was not a financial accommodations
agreement simply because the clearinghouse never intended to extend
credit to the debtor.121
Building on the Wills rationale, the bankruptcy court in Karsh Travel,
Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Corp. (In re Karsh Travel, Inc. )122 asserted that
section 365(c)(2) did not bar assumption of the agreement because it was
a contract to provide ordinary goods in the form of airline tickets. 123
Furthermore, from a policy standpoint, finding that the agreement was
not assumable would place the clearinghouses in control of travel agency
bankruptcies. 24 However, Congress had intended bankruptcy courts to
control such bankruptcies. 25
Later, in In re The Travel Shoppe, Inc.,126 the bankruptcy court
adopted a strict construction of "financial accommodations" along with
the Wills conclusions.' 27 The bankruptcy courts in In re Ambassador
118. Clearinghouses suffer when the agency is late in crediting funds or when the draft drawn on
the special account is dishonored. See id. at 354.
119. Six out of seven courts proclaim that these contracts are assumable. See infra notes 120-32
and accompanying text.
120. 72 B.R. 380 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987). Although the court eventually vacated this decision,
later courts consider its analysis because the vacation resulted from the need to correct technicalities.
See In re Ambassador Travel, Inc., 98 B.R. 1018, 1020 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
121. 72 B.R. at 383. The court contrasts the credit extension in the instant case with that in In
re Postle. See infra notes 152-53 and accompanying text. While in Postle, the agreement expressly
dictated that a nondebtor landlord had to expend $150,000 in construction allowances to the debtor,
in this case, the agreement contemplated no such allowance. 72 B.R. at 383. However, regardless of
whether the clearinghouse intended to extend credit, it had to do so when the debtor provided insuf-
ficient funds to cover the cost of the issued ticket. The involuntary nature of this type of credit
extension might make it even more injurious to the nondebtor simply because the nondebtor did not
plan for such financing.
122. 87 B.R. 110 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988).
123. Id. at 111.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 88 B.R. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1988).
127. Id. at 470.
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Travel, Inc. 128 and In re Charrington Worldwide Enterprises, Inc. 129 in-
quired into the true legal nature of the agreements and determined that
financing was only an incidental purpose of the agreements.1 30 Based on
precedent, the In re Skylark Inc. 131 bankruptcy court allowed assump-
tion of a clearinghouse agreement on the condition that the debtor
agency post a bond in accordance with the agreement.' 32
Most of the arguments advanced by the courts in the airline clearing-
house context apply to credit card merchant agreements as well. Like
clearinghouses, merchant banks do not intend to extend credit for the
merchant. 133 Moreover, just as airline tickets are ordinary goods, ar-
ranging for credit card transactions is an ordinary service.1 34 Thus, the
primary purpose of each contract is to provide for these services or
goods, not to extend financing. 135
However, presuming that credit card merchant agreements, like airline
clearinghouse agreements, should be assumable is not an airtight line of
reasoning. Notably, one court has held that clearinghouse agreements
are financial accommodations contracts, illustrating that the issue is not
completely resolved. In In re Lockspur, Inc., 136 the bankruptcy court
barred assumption of the airline agreement pursuant to section
365(c)(2). 137 The court based its decision on the agency's poor financial
condition and the agency's inability to post a security bond. 138  More
importantly, different circumstances surrounding credit card agreements
further strain any comparison to airline agreements. As alluded to in
Lockspur, airline agreements require a party to post a bond, effectively
128. 98 B.R. 1018 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1989).
129. 110 B.R. 973 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
130. Charrington, 110 B.R. at 975; Ambassador, 98 B.R. at 1020-21. In Ambassador, the court
determined that the underlying purpose of the agreement was to provide goods-airline tickets.
Ambassador, 98 B.R. at 1021. The Charrington court found that the purpose of the agreement was
to facilitate the sale of airline tickets and that any extension of credit was only incidental. Char-
rington, 110 B.R. at 975.
131. 120 B.R. 352 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990).
132. Id. at 355. The agreement originally required the agency to maintain a bond. Id. at 353.
Therefore, the court was merely requiring the debtor to comply with the agreement before assump-
tion would be allowed.
133. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
134. See Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1017.
135. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
136. 82 B.R. 37 (Bankr. E.D. La. 1987).
137. Id. at 40.
138. Id. at 39.
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reducing the clearinghouse's risk.3 9 No similar feature protects parties
to credit card merchant agreements. 14° Thus, the assumption of a credit
card merchant agreement is potentially more financially damaging than
assumption of clearinghouse agreements. 14 1
C. Financial Accommodations Contracts
Courts have developed many common theories in sustaining various
contracts as financial accommodations. Unfortunately, these rationales
easily apply to the credit card merchant agreement, which the In re
Hamilton court deemed assumable. For instance, several courts have de-
fined financial accommodation as "an obligation to pay money on the
obligation of another."' 42  In In re Adana Mortgage Bankers,143 Judge
Norton"4 asserted that an agreement under which the Government Na-
tional Mortgage Association (GNMA) guaranteed mortgage-backed se-
curities issued by the debtor mortgage banker was a financial
accommodations contract because GNMA was responsible for continued
payment of the debtor's liabilities to the security holders in the event that
the debtor failed to pay.'45
139. Skylark, 120 B.R. at 355; Charrington, 110 B.R. at 976; Ambassador, 98 B.R. at 1021;
Travel Shoppe, 88 B.R. at 470; Lockspur, 82 B.R. at 39.
140. In Hamilton, the bank could have established a reserve fund to protect itself from the
merchant's inability to pay a chargeback. 968 F.2d at 1017. If the credit card merchant agreement
required a reserve fund, it might be analogous.
141. But see Hamilton, 969 F.2d at 1019 n.10. According to the Hamilton court, a clearing-
house is at a greater risk than a merchant bank. While a clearinghouse must seek recourse against a
travel agent whenever the agent does not pay for issued tickets, the merchant bank only seeks re-
course in the case of valid chargebacks. Id. However, the court does not offer evidence that agents'
failing to pay for issued tickets occurs more frequently than valid chargebacks. Nor does the court
compare the financial impact on the creditors.
142. See Edwards Mobile Home Sales, Inc. v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 119 B.R. 857, 859 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990); Wegner Farms Co. v. Merchants Bonding Co. (In re Wegner Farms), 49 B.R. 440,
444 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985); Government Nat'l. Mortgage Corp. v. Adana Mortgage Bankers, (In
re Adana Mortgage Bankers), 12 B.R. 977, 987 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
143. 12 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990).
144. Norton is a renowned bankruptcy judge who served from 1971-1985 and is now editor in
chief of an annual survey on bankruptcy.
145. Adana, 12 B.R. at 986-87. In addition, Norton emphasized that the government guarantee
is essential to the issuer's business because it enables the issuer to obtain credit from securities pur-
chasers. According to Norton, a contract that is necessary to create a market for securities should
not be assumable. Id. at 987. It is difficult to reconcile this principle with the Karsh rationale,
which states that by making such an essential contract nonassumable, a court in essence places
control of bankruptcy in the hands of the GNMA, not in bankruptcy court where it belongs. See
supra notes 116-25.
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Similarly, in In re Wegner Farms,146 the bankruptcy court held that a
debtor grain dealer could not assume a surety bond it had obtained for
the benefit of persons buying or selling its grain because the contract
obligated the bond issuer to assume any liabilities the debtor did not
pay.147 In making its characterization, the Wegner court particularly
noted that the contract was intimately connected to the debtor's financial
status, as evidenced by the issuer's requirement that the debtor supply
financial statements and the fact that the issuer was uncomfortable with
the debtor's poor business performance.148 Applying this reasoning to a
credit card merchant agreement, a court could deduce that the contract
is a financial accommodation because it obligates the merchant bank to
pay the cardholder bank for valid chargebacks when the retailer is unable
to uphold its obligation to do so.149 Moreover, like the surety bond in
Wegner, the credit card merchant agreement depends largely on the re-
tailer's financial integrity as determined by the bank through its examina-
tion of financial statements. 150
In addition to considering a nondebtor party's obligation to pay on
behalf of the debtor under an executory contract to extend financial ac-
commodations, courts often assess a nondebtor's contractual duty to pro-
vide monetary allowances to the debtor. 51 For example, in In re
Postle,152 the court held that an unexpired lease was a contract to extend
financial accommodations because it required the landlord to finance
$150,000 in improvements made by the debtor tenant.15 1 Similarly, in In
re Placid Oil Co. ,154 the court stated in dictum 55 that a retroactive pre-
146. 49 B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1985).
147. Id. at 444.
148. Id. For a more in-depth discussion of this case, see Steven J. Wadyka, Executory Contracts
and Unexpired Leases: Section 365, 3 BANK. DEv. J. 217, 243-44 (1986).
149. See supra note 87.
150. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
151. See Advanced Professional Home Health Care, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich-
igan (In re Advanced Professional Home Health Care, Inc.), 82 B.R. 837, 843-44 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1988) (finding financial accommodations where government advanced money to health care
provider); In re Placid Oil, Co., 72 B.R. 135 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987) (finding financial accommoda-
tions where insurance paid claims first, then sought reimbursement from debtor); Dean v. Postle
Enterprises, Inc. (In re Postle Enterprises, Inc.), 48 B.R. 721 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985). For a discus-
sion of the Postle case, see infra notes 152-53.
152. 48 B.R. 721 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1985).
153. Id. at 725. Initially, the court determined that sections 365(c)(2) and (e)(2)(B) apply to
leases as well as other executory contracts. Id. at 724-25. For a more in-depth discussion of this
case, see Wadyka, supra note 148, at 242-43.
154. 72 B.R. 135 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1987).
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mium agreement was a financial accommodations contract because the
nondebtor insurance underwriters had paid the debtor's claimants before
receiving the debtor's premium payments.15 6 Basically, the nondebtor
insurance company had advanced the debtor the amount of the valid
claims against the debtor.157 In In re Advanced Professional Home
Health Care, Inc. , the court barred assumption of an agreement be-
tween a health care provider and the Department of Health and Human
Services because the agreement necessitated the government agency's
supplying the provider with working capital to be recouped at a later
date. 159
Utilizing these precedents, a court could describe a credit card
merchant agreement as a contract to extend financial accommodations.
By reimbursing the cardholder bank for valid chargebacks on behalf of
the debtor, the merchant bank provides the debtor with a financial allow-
ance. By advancing these funds to the debtor, the merchant bank resem-
bles a landlord who finances a tenant's improvements, an insurance
company that prepays a debtor's claims, and the Department of Health
and Human Services when it forwards payment for future performed
services.
In conclusion, the cases that evaluate executory contracts under sec-
tion 365(c)(2) demonstrate that courts are unable to effectively define "fi-
nancial accommodations." The fact that the credit card merchant
agreement, which the Eleventh Circuit recently evaluated, might logi-
cally fall under either characterization exemplifies this premise. Conse-
quently, it is virtually impossible to predict how a court will characterize
an executory contract with financing aspects.
155. Because the court found that the agreement was not an executory contract, the discussion
concerning the financial accommodations characterization is dictum. Id. at 138.
156. Id. at 139. The debtor offered demand notes as premium payments. It was after the insur-
ance company satisfied the debtor's claimants that the debtor paid premiums based on the actual
amount of the claims. Id.
157. In re Placid Oil Co. raises an interesting peripheral issue. According to the court, section
365(c)(2) protects not only the unwilling lender under an executory contract, but also all claimants
against the debtor's estate. Id. Consequently, a lender's consent to proceed with an executory con-
tract to extend financial accommodations does not render the contract assumable. See, e.g., Trans-
america Commercial Finance Corp. v. Citibank (In re Sun Runner Marine, Inc.), 945 F.2d 1089,
1092 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that an agreement under which the lender provided financing for a
retail dealer who purchased the debtor's boats was an unassumable contract to extend financial
accommodations despite the lender's consent to proceed).
158. 82 B.R. 837 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1988).
159. Id. at 844.
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IV. PROPOSAL
As evidenced by the judicial opinions recounted above, the law on ex-
ecutory contracts and section 365 is riddled with uncertainty. This con-
fused state of affairs benefits neither the debtor nor the creditor. The lack
of clear legislative or judicial authority fosters paralyzing debate between
parties to an executory contract. More importantly, forcing courts to
make all or nothing characterizations often denies the debtor the benefit
of executory contracts that should rightly be part of the estate or compels
the creditor to finance a party according to terms established under
vastly different economic circumstances. In order to abolish this uncer-
tainty and the ensuing debate, as well as to serve the best interests of both
the debtor and creditor, Congress should amend the Code to provide for
bifurcation of executory contracts with financing provisions. Under such
a scheme, the court would bifurcate the financing and nonfinancing pro-
visions of an executory contract. The trustee may then elect to assume
any executory contract without the severed financial accommodations. If
a contract were to demand financing, the trustee would need to secure it
from an outside source or renegotiate terms with the original nondebtor.
Three examples illustrate that bifurcation is a feasible option for deal-
ing with executory contracts to extend financial accommodations. If the
court had applied bifurcation to the credit card merchant agreement in
Hamilton," it would have permitted the retailer to assume the basic
contract and thus continue to conduct credit card transactions on the
condition that the chargeback procedure be modified to protect the bank
creditor. Modifications might include the debtor's posting a performance
bond or arranging for a third party to guarantee chargebacks. In es-
sence, the court would merely have required the debtor to provide ade-
quate assurance to the nondebtor party of an assumed financial
accommodations contract, just as the debtor must provide adequate as-
surance to a party to a contract upon which the debtor has defaulted161
or to a utility providing post-petition service.' 62 Furthermore, bifurca-
tion would operate similarly in the contexts of both Postle, in which the
160. See supra notes 73-98 and accompanying text.
161. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(C) (1988).
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 366(b) (1988). Cf Neil P. Olack, Executory Contracts and Unexpired
Leases: Right to Adequate Protection Prior to Assumption or Rejection, 4 BANK. DEv. J. 421 (1987).
Olack argues that there should not be adequate protection prior to assumption or rejection because
the contract is unenforceable until the trustee makes its election. However, this proposal contem-
plates offering adequate protection after the contract is assumed. Id.
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court denied assumption, 63 and Cole Bros. in which the court permitted
assumption."' In both cases, the debtors would reap the principal bene-
fits of the bargain-the lease and the dealership agreement, respec-
tively-by assuming the nonfinancing provisions of the contracts.
However, due to bifurcation, the debtors would have to renegotiate fi-
nancing for the construction improvements in Postle and the retail credit
in Cole Bros.
Clearly, bifurcation is not a means of preserving all executory con-
tracts to extend financial accommodations. For example, if a court sev-
ers the financing aspects of a letter of credit, there is little left for the
trustee to assume. However, this result corresponds to the general legis-
lative policy for enacting section 365.165 That is, the Code should not
compel unwilling creditors to finance a questionable party according to
outdated contract terms. Still, as the examples above demonstrate, 166 bi-
furcation is a practical way to deal consistently 67 with mixed contracts
that are unsuited to the current "all or nothing" approach in section
365(c)(2). 168
In addition to offering a viable method for handling mixed contracts,
bifurcation upholds the Code's two general policies. 169 First, bifurcation
encourages a fresh start because the debtor receives the benefit of the
contract, absent the financing provisions, during the rehabilitation pro-
cess. 170 Second, bifurcation protects creditors by not forcing them to ex-
tend credit to an insecure party according to outdated terms. Moreover,
163. See supra notes 152-53 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
167. The approach is consistent because mixed contracts are treated alike. Therefore, when con-
fronted with a contract that has some financing aspects, one need not guess how the court will
characterize the contract.
168. "All or nothing" refers to the fact that a court must either characterize a contract as one to
extend financial accommodations or as one that does not extend financial accommodations. There is
no middle ground in these decisions. Describing the current Code position as "all or nothing" does
not mean that a debtor must assume a contract in its original form. The Code provides for certain
limited modifications. For example, I1 U.S.C. § 365(e) eliminates ipso facto clauses and 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(0 bars anti-assignment clauses. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e) & (f) (1988). See also In re Kennesaw
Dairy Queen Brazier, 28 B.R. 535, 536 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983).
169. See supra Part II B.
170. It is significant that a debtor would seem to have more power under this bifurcation scheme
than does a debtor under reaffirmation. When a debtor and nondebtor agree to reaffirm a contract
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 554, the nondebtor can alter major terms of the original contract and give
the debtor the choice to reaffirm. 11 U.S.C. § 554 (1988). Here, the nondebtor only has the benefit
of removing financing provisions from the contract.
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by appreciating that financial circumstances may deteriorate over time,
this policy encourages voluntary contractual credit relationships. 171 Ar-
guably, lenders will be more willing initially to take risks in forming con-
tracts if they understand that the law win protect them when a
bankruptcy filing alters the assumptions on which the contract was
based.1 71 In fact, bifurcation fulfills the two fundamental bankruptcy
goals better than the current procedure. Currently, courts fluctuate be-
tween either bolstering the debtor's rehabilitation or accommodating the
nondebtor party, depending on how a court chooses to characterize a
particular contract. Under bifurcation, the court serves both parties' in-
terests in every case.
Furthermore, bifurcation embodies the rationales that courts have ex-
pressed in the section 365 cases outlined in Part III. For instance, the
bifurcation procedure recognizes the incidental nature of the financial
accommodations in many contracts173 by permitting the trustee to as-
sume the primary, nonfinancing contractual provisions. Additionally, bi-
furcation acknowledges that the obligation to extend credit to or on
behalf of the debtor is indeed a burdensome financial accommodation
that the creditor should not be forced to carry out.174
Additionally, despite apparent inconsistencies, bifurcation does not
conflict with the inviolate policy prohibiting partial assumption of execu-
tory contracts. Since 1938, when Congress enacted section 70(b), courts
have held that a trustee may not choose, piecemeal, which provisions it
wishes to assume, and then reject the rest.175 In other words, a trustee
may not accept the benefits of an executory agreement without accepting
the burdens as well. 176 However, this bifurcation proposal envisions an
171. See Nimmer, supra note 6, at 522-32.
172. Id. at 514, 538.
173. See supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
175. See COLLIER, supra note 32, 365.01l1] & n.5.
176. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1984) (assuming contract
cum onere); Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 213 U.S. 126 (1909) (holding that debtor must
assume burdens as well as benefits); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303,
1311 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Vials and Sommer, Inc. v. Mahony (In re SteelShip Corp.), 576 F.2d
128, 132 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); Schokbeton Industries, Inc. v. Schokbeton Products Corp., 466 F.2d
171, 175 (5th Cir. 1972) (same); Kirby v. U.S., 329 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1964) (same); Auto
Dealer Services, Inc. v. Vince Whibbs Imports, Inc. (In re Auto Dealer Services, Inc.), 110 B.R. 68,
70 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (same); Tidewater Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Owen (In re Tidewater
Memorial Hosp., Inc.), 106 B.R. 876, 884 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989) (same); In re Maine, 32 B.R. 452,
455 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (citations omitted) (same).
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entirely different scenario. Unlike the partial assumption situation in
which a trustee picks only the attractive provisions, under bifurcation,
the court dictates which provisions are unassumable as financial accom-
modations. The trustee would then have the option of assuming or re-
jecting all of the nonfinancing provisions that the court finds allowable.
Like the current rule prohibiting partial assumption, bifurcation would
not permit potentially abusive party discretion.
Finally, the Code already provides for bifurcation in several instances.
For example, when a debtor files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, the
court immediately divides the debtor's interests into those that are prop-
erty of the estate 177 and those that remain the debtor's individual prop-
erty. 178 Additionally, under section 506(a), the court bifurcates an
allowed claim that has been secured by a lien on property of the estate
into two claims: a secured claim to the extent of the creditor's interest in
the property and an unsecured claim for the remaining portion of the
allowed claim. 17 9 Similarly, under section 506(a), the court bifurcates an
allowed claim that is subject to setoff under section 553 into a secured
claim for the amount of setoff and an unsecured claim for the remaining
portion of the allowed claim. 18 0 Accordingly, there is no apparent reason
why Congress should not advocate bifurcation in this area as well.
V. CONCLUSION
By amending the Code to include the bifurcation proposal outlined in
Part IV, Congress would provide courts and attorneys with a straightfor-
ward and equitable method of dealing with executory contracts to extend
financial accommodations. Bifurcation would relieve courts of the un-
certainty they have expressed in attempting to characterize these con-
tracts and would serve the interests of both parties to the executory
contract.
Julia S. Jansen
177. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
178. Id. For example, a debtor's post-petition wages are not property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(a)(6).
179. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
180. Id.
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